Рефлексивные процессы и управление. Сборник материалов XI Международного симпозиума 16-17 октября 2017 г., Москва - стр. 8

Second order cybernetics, as developed in the US, focused initially on the biology of cognition. For a long time there had been a consensus among scientists that the observer should be eliminated from scientific consideration in an effort to be unbiased and objective. However, a few scientists felt that the observer could not be eliminated from science, since scientific theories are created by observers and are interpreted by other observers. To claim that the observer could and should be removed from discussion was a way of neglecting or overlooking the purposes that scientists are pursuing when they do research.

A second interpretation of second order cybernetics was that including the observer in science would involve social concerns, since these exist in the minds of observers. At the time a third order cybernetics was thought not to be necessary, since reflection would be sufficient to encompass both the biology of cognition and the influence of society on the development of science. However, third order cybernetics could be interpreted to mean a concern with the evolution of society, with the interaction between ideas and society and with the invention and dissemination of ideas which, if they became widespread, might aid the development of society (Umpleby 1999, 2002). This presentation will consider this interpretation of third order cybernetics by looking at the evolution of society as a series of problem-solving experiments.

The book by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Why Nations Fail, suggested that there are two processes in creating a successful nation. The first process requires creating a centralized authority that has the ability to combine resources and use them for the purposes of the society. The second process is the development of institutions and social arrangements that guide the use of resources for the development of society as a whole, not just for the benefit of elites. To illustrate the importance of institutions compared with culture, climate or geography Acemoglu and Robinson cite many examples. Nogales, Arizona, in the U.S. and Nogales, Mexico, are just across the border from each other. The populations are very similar in language and religion. But the residents in Arizona have higher average incomes and quality of life than residents in Mexico because the institutions (schools, police and courts) work better in Arizona than in Mexico. Other examples of institutional differences being more important than culture and geography are East and West Germany and North and South Korea. The authors note that countries can change their economic trajectories by changing their institutions, as has happened in China and Russia in recent decades.